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ABSTRACT

Does a leader’s psychology affect his/her likelihood of initiating a militarized interstate
dispute? The study of leadership psychology has continuously found support for the central
assumption that leaders matter in explaining a state’s foreign policy behavior. However, many of
these research projects have relied on small-sample case studies and experimental methods that
have limited generalizability. In this paper, I use two variables drawn from the research program
on leadership trait analysis (distrust and need for power) in a multivariate large-n study to
explain the initiation of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs). 1,601 cases are drawn from the
Correlates of War MID data set. First, using an ANOVA model, I demonstrate that MID
initiators have higher average scores for both distrust and need for power and that this difference
is statistically significant. Then, using logistic regression, I demonstrate that distrust and need for
power have statistically significant positive effects on the likelihood of MID initiation. I
conclude by comparing the predicted probabilities of the psychological variables of interest with
territorial contiguity. All of these methods demonstrate that the psychological traits of leaders
have an important effect on the likelihood of MID initiation.
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INTRODUCTION
The substantive question this paper seeks to ask is: does a leader’s need for power and
level of distrust affect his/her willingness to initiate a militarized interstate dispute (MID)? The
conflict studies literature is rich with research about MIDs, and that research has identified
several structural explanations for the occurrence of militarized interstate disputes. However, this
preponderance of structural explanations for MID onset or initiation leaves out a fundamental
variable: the heads of state in the international system. The field of political psychology has
provided some insights about how leadership personality traits affect foreign policy behavior.
Unfortunately, a majority of the psychological models of foreign policy and international
relations have involved analyzing a small number of historical cases (Levy 2013, 302). In this
paper, I apply variables from leadership trait analysis to a large-N study of militarized interstate
dispute initiation.
In this larger-N study, I find that both distrust and need for power have strong,
statistically significant, and positive effects on the likelihood a state will Initiate a MID. Further,
I demonstrate that one variable in particular, distrust, performs better than territorial contiguity at
explaining an increased probability of MID initiation. This research shows that psychological
variables, when tested in a large-N setting, can perform as well or better than the more easily
tested structural variables at explaining the initiation of a militarized interstate dispute.
To follow will be a review of the existing literature discussing the initiation of militarized
interstate disputes, and what political psychology has to say about the initiation of conflict more
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broadly. Following the literature review will be a clearly spelled out theoretical justification for
the chosen independent variables and hypotheses.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
A militarized interstate dispute is defined as: “a set of interactions between or among
states involving threats to use military force, displays of military force, or actual uses of military
force. To be included these acts must be explicit, overt, non-accidental, and government
sanctioned” (Gochman and Moaz 1984, 587). As stated in the introduction, the conflict studies
literature has contributed several structural explanations for the occurrence of international
conflict. The following review of the literature will discuss research focused on the occurrence of
international conflict.
Power Parity and International Conflict
One of the earliest bodies of literature considering causes of international conflict focused
on the importance of dyadic balance of power. Garnham (1976) clearly lays out the three
fundamental assumptions of the power parity hypothesis and seeks to test them empirically. The
three central assumptions are: 1) governments are rational and will only use force if the
perceived benefits outweigh the perceived costs 2) governments will only use force if they
cannot achieve their goals through diplomacy 3) governments calculate costs and benefits based
on comparisons of their nation’s power with that of their potential target (Garnham 1976, 380).
As expected, Garnham found that geographically contiguous states with roughly equal power
would have a higher probability of engaging in lethal violence (1976, 390).
An essential component of the understanding of power’s effect on aggressive foreign
policy behavior stems from the research of power transition theory. Power transition theory
assumes that hegemons face challenges from growing major powers who have become
dissatisfied with the system status quo (Sobek and Wells 2013, 69). Research in this area of
3

international relations has found support for the theory in various ways over 40 years (DiCicco
and Levy 1999, 675-676). Rather than emphasizing the presence of parity between states, power
transition theory focuses on power shifts. Spiezio (1999) demonstrates there is a relationship
between “critical point intervals” and a great power’s propensity for involvement in a militarized
dispute. Until recently, the research focused on the interactions of major power states. Sobek and
Wells made the logical connection that if power transition theory is true for great powers, the
logic would apply to other dyads (2013, 69).
This research vein, though robust, is an incomplete picture of the causes of interstate
conflict. Like many structural explanations of international interactions, excluding the
individuals inside the organizations leaves it open to criticism. The central assumption of
research like this implies that each head of state – who is the principal decision maker in the
realm of foreign policy – would perceive changes in the dyadic balance of power in the same
way.
Alliances and International Conflict
Jack levy produced one of the most notable empirical studies exploring the relationship
between alliance formation and great power conflict over a large span of time (1981). The
findings of this research indicate that, after the Congress of Vienna, the nature of alliances
changed to alliances that were more likely to create a more peaceful international system (Levy
1981). However, the research itself has a number of shortcomings that called for further
investigation. First, like many pieces of research in the study of conflict, the focus rests on the
presence of conflict in the system rather than its initiation. Therefore, it is challenging to make a
statement about the potential deterrent effect of alliance formation or vice versa (Bennett and
4

Stam 2000b). Further, the research focuses only on the occurrence of great power wars and
conflicts across a broad time span, which greatly limits the generalizability of the findings.
Leeds (2003) took some of the fundamental assumptions of alliance and conflict research
and applied them to the initiation of militarized interstate disputes. Leeds notes that simply
asking the question, “do alliances lead to peace or war?” is insufficient (2006, 427). Unlike Levy
(1981), Leeds distinguishes between the different types of alliances when constructing her model
(2003). Leeds finds that the type of alliance (defensive, offensive, or neutrality agreement)
affects the probability of initiation differently (2003). If the potential target has a defensive ally,
the likelihood of initiating a MID decreases; and if the potential initiator has an offensive ally or
a neutrality agreement the likelihood of that state initiating a MID increases (Leeds 2003, 435).
However, it is not simply the focus on differing alliance types that gives this research more
explanatory value. Leeds also uses the directed-dyad year as the unit of analysis and therefore
provides better information about the effect of alliances on conflict initiation rather than merely
its presence in the international system.
An additional piece of research considered the potential effect of alliance formation on
conflict initiation somewhat differently. First, the central premise of the article is that the
processes that result in the formation of interstate alliances cannot be divorced from the
processes that result in the initiation of conflict (Kimball 2006, 371). The author finds that the
regime type of member dyads is a more significant predictor of alliance formation and conflict
behavior respectively (Kimball 2006, 386). This research diverges from a majority of alliance
research by arguing that alliances by themselves do not have a direct effect on the willingness to
engage in interstate conflict, rather that alliances have an indirect effect.
5

Like most research into structural causes of MID initiation, the alliance research agenda
fails to consider how leaders may vary in their perceptions of the importance of alliances. Some
leaders may be more risk acceptant than others and there may well be an interaction between the
presence or absence of allies and a leader’s level of risk acceptance. This interaction could cause
the significance of alliances to disappear in some cases.
Democratic Peace
The democratic peace theory has largely been considered by many scholars to be the
closest thing to a law of nature in international relations. The democratic peace has two central
empirical claims: 1) democracies are unlikely to fight one another; 2) democracies are just as
conflict prone as non-democracies (Rousseau et al. 1996, 512). Though the democratic peace
literature has said a great deal about the presence or absence of dyadic international conflict,
there is a surprising absence of attempts to explain which states actually initiate conflict. The
following section will consider some of the democratic peace literature that addresses the factors
affecting initiation of militarized interstate dispute.
Reiter and Stam (2003) begin addressing a recurring problem in the democratic peace
literature by changing the dependent variable of focus from onset (the presence or absence of
conflict in a dyad) to initiation (one side taking a directed action against another). Their findings
support earlier research (see Peceny, Beer, and Sanchez-Terry 2002) that democracypersonalistic dictatorship dyads are more conflict prone than other democracy-dictatorship
dyads. However, they are also able to identify the direction of the dyadic conflict relationship,
and show that dictatorships (regardless of type) are more likely to initiate disputes with
democracies (Reiter and Stam 2003, 336).
6

Before Reiter and Stam’s (2003) study of factors affecting the propensity to initiate
conflict, Ireland and Gartner (2001) considered causes of conflict initiation within certain
democratic regimes. Using hazard analysis to measure the duration between the formation of a
governing coalition and the initiation of the first MID, Ireland and Gartner find that majority and
coalition governments in a parliamentary system are more likely to initiate MIDs sooner than
minority governments in similar systems (2001, 558-561). Their findings also provide support
for some alliance hypotheses by showing that having allies decreases the probability of conflict
initiation (Ireland and Gartner 2001, 559). More broadly, these findings provide support for the
hypothesis that democracies fight less because of perceived political vulnerability. Majority and
coalition governments are far less vulnerable than minority governments and are willing to take
the risk of initiating MIDs (Ireland and Gartner 2001, 561).
Building upon that research Reiter and Tillman attempt to uncover how democracies
make foreign policy decisions differently than other states in the international system (2002, 811812). The authors find that differing aspects within democracy have an effect on the propensity
to initiate MIDs. They find that greater political participation and an independent legislature have
strong negative effects on the willingness to initiate disputes (Reiter and Tillman 2002, 821).
However, being a major power and having autocratic states on the border increases the
likelihood of initiating MIDs (Reiter and Tillman 2002, 821).
In 2006, Lai and Slater considered institutional variation between autocracies in an effort
to explain conflict behavior. Using the monadic state-year as the unit of analysis, Lai and Slater
find that in a model where democracies are excluded, only military dictatorships were more
likely to initiate conflict than party-based authoritarian regimes (2006, 121). In addition, there is
7

no statistically significant difference between party-based authoritarian regimes and democracies
and their likelihood to initiate MIDs (Lai and Slater 2006, 121). All the previous research
focused not simply on the factors affecting conflict initiation between autocracies and
democracies, but also on the factors within these different styles of government that made them
more or less conflict prone.
The Liberal Peace
Moving away from a focus on regime type, Oneal and colleagues (1996) consider the
importance of economic interdependence for the onset of MIDs. The authors find that the power
of the democratic peace theory is greatly magnified by the presence or absence of economic
interdependence at the dyadic level (Oneal et al. 1993, 23-24). These findings are replicated in a
later study with adjustments to the measurement of joint democracy (Oneal and Ray 1997).
However, Barbieri (1996) finds that trade interdependence does not significantly decrease the
propensity for conflict. Rather, the impact of trade on dyadic conflict onset is curvilinear. If a
dyad is too interdependent or the relationship is too asymmetrical, the propensity for conflict
increases in a statistically significant way (Barbieri, 1996, pp. 42-44). This finding is challenged
by a subsequent study that finds no evidence that asymmetric trade increases the likelihood of
MID onset for politically relevant dyads (Oneal & Russett, 1999).
Souva and Prins consider the effect of economic interdependence on the willingness of a
state to initiate violent MIDs in particular (2006). Using a monadic model, the authors find that
economic interdependence has a statistically significant negative effect on the initiation of
violent MIDs. However, the magnitude is not as large as regime type and typical variables for
conflict initiation such as national-capabilities (Souva and Prins 2006, 194). The findings in this
8

research should be taken with a grain of salt. To determine which state initiated, the authors rely
on the classification of a state as having revisionist intentions as opposed to being classified as
the Side A state, which is coded as the first militarized movers by the MID data set (Souva and
Prins 2006, 190). However, only 55.6% of states on Side A are coded as revisionist states
(Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer 2004, 138). Coding revisionist states as initiators leaves out a large
percentage of potential cases. Using a similar research design, Boehmer found support for the
argument that democracies are less likely than other states to initiate MIDs (2008). The author
differed coding Side A states as the initiator rather than the coding revisionist states as initiators
(Boehmer 2008, 88-91).
A more recent study has considered the pacifying effect of trade by considering the effect
of exit costs. Peterson (2014) argues that trade is only pacifying when the cost of terminating that
trade, often associated with the onset of dyadic conflict, is roughly equal between states in a
dyad. Rather than assuming that bilateral trade is almost always pacifying, Peterson demonstrates
empirically that conflict is more likely when only one of the two states has more to lose by
terminating the trade relationship (2014, 584-585). However, it is worth noting that Peterson
does not consider MID initiation as many other authors do, rather considers the raw number of
conflict events as the dependent variable (Peterson 2014, 569-570).
The Economic Peace
A more recent area of research argues that democracy matters less than the type of
economic system within a state in question. This research area argues that the norms that arise in
developed market economies are the cause of pacific relations previously attributed to the
degrees of democracy. One of the earliest articles published in this area considered the
9

possibility that the democratic peace was limited only to well developed economies with strong
contract norms and enforcement (Mousseau 2000). In this article, Mousseau makes a convincing
argument for the connection between contract/economic norms, the emergence of democracy and
democratic values, and the underlying reason the democratic peace exists (2000, 475-482).
Building on this idea, Mousseau demonstrates that not only are economically developed
democracies less likely to engage in conflict with one another, they are more likely to collaborate
in militarized conflicts (2002).
As the research area evolved, researchers began discounting the democratic peace as it
became clearer that the contract norms within a country may do a better job at explaining the
presence or absence of conflict between states. Mousseau demonstrates that contract-intensive
economies – states with strong contract enforcement – engaged in no fatal MIDs between 19612001, while democracies without these contract norms are not as pacific (2009, 53). Unlike many
of the other structural explanations for the presence or absence of conflict, economic norms
theorists began including explicit, albeit untested, assumptions about the role psychology may
play in conflict. Mousseau argued that contract-poor (clientelist) economies, because of their
reliance on interpersonal connections for economic activity (tribe/clan/religion), create
individuals with higher levels of distrust and in-group bias that contractualist (contract-intensive)
economies (2013, 187-188). Nevertheless, economic norms theory has provided an interesting
perspective into understanding the emergence of international conflict. Despite its contributions,
like many of the other structural explanations, there needs to be empirical testing of the effects of
leadership psychology.
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Political Psychology and Dispute Initiation
Political psychology has contributed a variety of interesting theories and findings to the
understanding of international conflict. However, as stated above, much of the research has
relied on small-sample case studies or difficult-to-generalize experiments to explain the agent
aspect of foreign policy behavior (Levy 2013, 302). This section will review the literature
contributed by political psychology to the understanding of international conflict by moving the
focus from the state as the unit of analysis, to the individual leaders who make foreign policy
decisions.
Operational code analysis has been a prominent tool to assess leadership belief systems in
the post-World War II era. Operational code analysis has evolved to focus on a political belief
system in which elements (philosophical beliefs) guide a leader’s understanding of the context
for action and other elements (instrumental beliefs) prescribe the strategy and tactics for
achieving political goals (Walker, Schafer, and Young 2003, 216). Operational code analysis has
been used to explain variation in American foreign policy behavior in response to international
strategic adjustment (Walker, Schafer, and Young 1999). This method has also been used to
explore various aspects of the democratic peace hypothesis. Schafer and Walker explore the
monadic-level and dyadic-level hypotheses associated with the democratic peace (2006). In
addition, they address the assumption that the behavior of democratic states is informed by the
norms of governance within that state (Schafer and Walker 2006). Interestingly, they were able
to demonstrate findings similar to other liberal theorists comparing the operational codes of Bill
Clinton and Tony Blair. They demonstrated found little support for the monadic assumption –
democracies are generally more peaceful – and for the assumption that the different norms of
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governing affected their beliefs, while finding that both were more peaceful toward democracies
than other states in general (Schafer and Walker 2006, 575-576).
Earlier, Hermann and Kegley (1995) also brought the idea of leadership psychology more
directly into the research about the democratic peace. Without trying to dispute the central
premises of the democratic peace theory, Hermann and Kegley sought to answer the question of
“why democracies behave the way they do,” by incorporating theories from political psychology
(1995, 511-512). In the same year, Kegley and Hermann moved forward with empirical testing
of their theory, considering the case of the Reagan Administration’s covert military interventions
in the 1980s, and demonstrate that the primary factor used by Reagan involved aspects of his
psychology first and his government institutional constraints second (1995, 23) (For a critique of
their findings, see Tures 2001).
Building upon the above research, Keller (2005) explores the interaction between regime
type and leadership style. In an attempt to address the conflicting views of the monadic aspects
of the democratic peace (democracies are generally more pacific), Keller considers whether
leaders’ willingness to respect or challenge constraints explains differences in democratic
responses to foreign policy crises (2005). Keller finds that leaders willing to respect constraints
in a democratic system are significantly more likely to use non-violent means when dealing with
foreign policy crises than democratic leaders who are not constraint respecters (2005, 225-226).
Interestingly, findings also indicate that leaders in democracies who are more willing to
challenge constraints are likely to place an emphasis on violence and use more severe violence
than their autocratic counterparts that respect constraints (Keller 2005, 225-226).
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Keller and Foster explored the relationship between what they call a leader’s perception
of a the locus of control and the number of uses of diversionary force by U.S. Presidents between
1953 and 2000 (2012). They find that leaders high in self-confidence and high in their belief in
ability to control events are more likely to use force against state and non-state actors in periods
of declining popularity (Keller and Foster 2012, 594-595). Most recently, Foster and Keller
found that leaders with high scores for distrust and low scores for conceptual complexity were
more likely to use force when faced with domestic opposition or falling popularity (2013).
Though both of these studies provide valuable insight into the link between leadership traits and
aggressive foreign policy behavior, both studies focus only on the diversionary use of force by
the United States (Keller and Foster 2012; Foster and Keller 2013). This greatly hinders the
generalizability of the findings beyond the hegemonic state or beyond simply the use of force as
a political tool.
Another area of research considers the effect of integrative complexity on the emergence
of international conflict. Integrative complexity refers to the way in which a leader processes
information. A leader scoring low in integrative complexity is characterized by simple responses,
large distinctions, rigidity, and restricted information usage; while a leader scoring high is
characterized by complexity, flexibility, and effective information search (Suedfeld and Tetlock
1977, 169).
Other scholars consider the effect of motivations on the outbreak and duration of conflict.
For instance, David Winter finds that a high need for power and a low need for affiliation often
precipitate the outbreak of war. Further, Winter finds that wars already underway only end when
there is a decrease in the need for power and an increase in the need for affiliation (1993).
13

However, like much of the earlier political psychology research, this research focuses on a small
number of cases (3) of international conflict.
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THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS AND HYPOTHESES
Within much of the international relations literature, there has been an emphasis on
explaining foreign policy behavior using various structural or situational variables. These works
have implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, assumed that heads of state make decisions in a
vacuum (Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin 2002, 76; Levy 2013, 301). However, Jack Levy notes that
the explanations of many important historical events often give great causal weight to the leader
in charge (2013, 301). As the literature review above demonstrates, some scholars of
international relations have to come to accept that who leads matters.
Granted, there has been rigorous debate about which psychological factors of leaders
matter. Some scholars emphasize the importance of political beliefs of individual leaders
(Schafer and Walker 2006; Walker, Schafer, and Young 1999; Walker, Schafer, and Young
2003). Others consider factors such as group decision-making processes and how they are
affected by individuals (Schafer and Crichlow 2010). The literature review above demonstrates
the diversity of research based on the premise that leaders matter in explaining foreign policy
behavior. There is widespread agreement that people matter in the conduct of foreign policy
decision-making.
For the purpose of this paper, leadership style will be the theoretical area of focus. There
have been a number of empirical research projects demonstrating the importance of leadership
style in explaining varying political behavior (see Hermann 2003, 184). Leadership style
attempts to explain how leaders relate to those around them, how they structure interactions, and
the norms, rules and principles they use to guide them (Hermann 2003, 181). Rather than
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focusing on broad categories, such as willingness to respect constraints (i.e. Keller 2005), I focus
on two variables within leadership trait analysis: distrust and need for power.
Distrust and Foreign Policy Behavior
Distrust is often connected with the leader’s perception of the world he/she is working in.
Distrustful leaders perceive the world as being more dangerous than leaders who are more
trusting. Rather than thinking of distrust as the opposite of trust, it may be more beneficial to
think of distrust as a personality trait that can shift depending on the situation. A leader may
become more distrustful overtime if he/she is repeatedly taken advantage of by other heads of
state.
Leaders with high levels of distrust tend to have a general feeling of doubt, uneasiness,
misgiving, and wariness about others (Hermann 2003, 202). Therefore, these individuals are
likely to suspect the motivations and actions of other, particularly in regards to those they view
as competitors (Hermann 2003, 202). In the domain of foreign policy, distrust has been shown to
be one of the most important determinants of a hawkish foreign policy (Foster and Keller 2013
5). Distrust causes higher threat perceptions and increases a leader’s willingness to use force to
neutralize those threats (Driver 1977; Holsti 1962 as cited in Foster and Keller 2013, 5).
However, much of the literature regarding threat perception relies upon an actor’s
response to a specific action taken by another actor. I assume that leaders who score higher for
distrust will not only be suspect of those they perceive as competitors; they will also see a greater
number of competitors in the international arena. Therefore, distrustful leaders will be more
likely to be more aggressive with a larger number of states than less distrustful leaders. The first
hypothesis emerges from this assumption:
16

H1: Leaders with higher scores for distrust will be more likely to initiate militarized
interstate disputes.
Need for Power and Foreign Policy Behavior
The need for power motive can be defined as a concern about having impact, control, or
influence on another person, group, or world at large (Winter 2003, 155). A high need for power
may manifest itself as increased visibility and an attraction to careers that give them control over
a situation (Winter 2003, 158). However, the shadowy side of the power motive may also bring
serious negative consequence. People with a high power motivation are susceptible to flattery
and tend to improve only after success rather than failure; in decision-making there is little
attention paid to moral considerations; these individuals may be extreme risk takers who engage
in aggressive (verbal or physical) and impulsive behavior (Winter 2003, 158).
Leaders with a high need for power have been shown to more independent and
confrontational in their foreign policy interaction while expressing a more generally negative
affect toward other states in general (Winter 2003, 163). Motive research has often indicated that
a high power motivation is a strong explanatory variable for entry into war (Winter 1993, 534).
Though these findings have been applied primarily to small-sample research, it is assumed that
the finding will remain significant in a larger-sample study of conflict initiation. Therefore, a
second hypothesis is constructed:
H2: Leaders with higher scores for need for power will be more likely to initiate
militarized interstate disputes.
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RESEARCH DESIGN
Sample
The sample used for this research consists of cases from the Correlates of War Dyadic
MID Data Set (COWMID). Using the EUGene software, a directed dyad-year data set has been
constructed. The sample consists of 1,601 cases of MID initiations and no MID initiations
between the years 1995-2001. The total number of conflict dyads in this sample is 39 and the
total number of non-conflict dyads is 1,562.1 Because speech texts were not readily available for
every leader in every possible directed dyad, I was forced to drop some of the initially-selected
cases based upon availability – or in this case lack thereof – of data. As a result, I have texts for
68 leaders between 1995-2001, some of whom initiated a MID, and some did not.2 A list of those
leaders who initiated MIDs and their scores for both psychological variables of interest is
presented in Appendix A. I discuss my speech text sources more in the section on variables.
Finally, some cases had to be dropped because of missing data for defensive alliance and polity
scores.
The directed dyad-year is the appropriate unit of analysis for a variety of reasons. First,
the directed dyad-year is the only unit of analysis that can be used to understand initiation rather
than simply the onset of a militarized interstate dispute. Also, since my primary variables are
individual-level variables (psychology), a unit of analysis that allows for the incorporation of

1

MID initiations are rare events. Therefore, it is not uncommon to have this ratio of MID initiations to noninitiations in dyadic data.
2
Remember, the unit of analysis is the politically relevant directed dyad-year not the individual leader. Therefore, a
single leader has more than one potential dyadic interaction. That is how I can have 1,601 cases, while only having
speech texts for 68 leaders.
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variables at more than one level of analysis is needed and thus the directed dyad-year is more
appropriate (Bennett and Stam 2000a, 655-656). Though I am focusing on the importance of
individual-level variables, it would be foolish to assume that leaders operate in a vacuum.
In addition, for the sample, only politically-relevant dyads are used. Politically relevant
dyads are considered to be the population of dyads at greatest risk for international conflict
(Lemke and Reed 2001, 126). Politically-relevant dyads are pairs of states that are either
geographically contiguous (on land or separated by some amount of water) or contain at least
one major power (Bennett 2006, 245; Lemke and Reed 2001, 126). For this research, a dyad will
be considered politically relevant if the states in the dyad share a land border or are separated by
up to 400 miles of water or less. A thorough study of the various operationalizations of political
relevance show this minimizes the number of conflict cases potentially left out (Bennett 2006).
Though conflicts have occurred in non-politically-relevant dyads, research indicates that
excluding these cases in a sample does not threaten valid inference (Lemke and Reed 2001, 140143). The use of politically-relevant dyads permits me to exclude cases that did not have the
opportunity to fight, which allows me to focus on factors affecting willingness rather than both
opportunity and willingness (Bennett 2006, 246).
Next, only the first year of the MID is coded as the initiation year, and subsequent years
are dropped from the data set. EUGene gives a researcher the ability to drop all dyads that begin
the year with an ongoing dispute (Bennett and Stam 2000b, 186). Bennett and Stam argue that
when ongoing conflicts are included, statistical assumptions of case independence break down.
As a result, though there may be a new MID in subsequent years, any changes to the independent
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variables during an ongoing conflict are endogenous to the process of initiation (2000a, 661).
Finally, I will not include reverse (hypothetical target versus initiator) dyads in my data set.
Variables
The dependent variable for this study is the initiation (or not) of a militarized interstate
dispute. For this paper, the dispute initiator will be determined by the COWMID data set’s
coding for “Side A” states. Side A states are coded as initiators if they are the first states to
threaten, display, or use force during an interaction with another state (Gochman and Maoz,
1984). Some have disagreed with this operationalization of the initiator; some scholars believe
that the revisionist state (the state seeking a change to the international status quo) should be
coded as the initiator (Bennett and Stam 2000a, 658; Souva and Prins 2006). However, this
classification is inappropriate for this research since I am trying to understand things that lead
heads of state to initiate militarized conflicts, not pursue a change in the status quo. Only 55.6%
of states coded as revisionist actually militarize disputes (Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer 2004,
138). Identifying which of those revisionist states is willing to use violence to pursue change in
the status quo is beyond the scope of this research.
The first independent variable is leader distrust. Distrust is an interval-level variable, and
the score will be determined using Profiler Plus content analysis software
(www.socialscienceautomation.com). The content to be analyzed will be public speeches,
interviews, and press conferences gathered from available open sources. Public statements made
before the initiation of a MID or the start of a non-conflict year will be necessary. The second
independent variable, need for power, will be scored using Profiler Plus as well. The time frame
for the verbal material is the year prior to the conflict or non-conflict year.
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Need for power is coded by focusing on verbs. The conditions of need for power are
scored when the speaker proposes or engages in a strong or forceful action such as an assault or
attack, verbal through, accusation or reprimand; gives advice or assistance when it is not
solicited; tries to persuade, bribe, or argue with someone else only if the concern is not reach
agreement; and is concerned with his/her reputation (Herrmann 2003, 190). When coding for
distrust, Profiler Plus will focus on nouns and noun phrases referring to persons other than the
leader and the leader’s group. First, a noun or noun phrase is coded as indicating distrust if it
expresses distrust, doubt, misgivings about, feelings of unease about, feeling of weariness about
what persons or groups other than the leader’s are doing. Second, if a leader shows concern
about what these persons or groups are doing and perceive such actions to be harmful, wrong,
etc. to him or herself, an ally, a friend, or a cause important to them (Hermann 2003, 202-203). I
provide excerpts of speeches that scored highest and lowest for distrust and need for power in
Appendix B, C, and D respectively.
The speech texts for this research come from a variety of sources. Some were pulled from
wire services and broadcast transcripts via the database Lexis Nexis. So long as the leader being
examined is quoted directly – not paraphrased – the transcripts were considered a valid source
material. For U.S. Presidents, I relied heavily on the American Presidency Project’s database of
news conferences. For more elusive leaders, I found prepared speeches at some
intergovernmental organization gatherings, such as the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). I
also pulled text from parliamentary debates using Hansard or other various governmental
websites when applicable.
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I will include several control variables in the design. The first control variable is the
regime type. It is theoretically argued that democratic regimes will be less likely to initiate
conflicts than non-democratic states (Reiter and Stam 2003). The ordinal score for side A will be
pulled from the Polity IV data set. The measure of joint democracy will be taken from the Polity
IV Data set also and will be presented as a dichotomous variable in accordance with standard
democratic peace research: a dyad is coded as a jointly democratic if both states have a polity
score 6 or higher (Souva and Prins 2006, 192). Joint democracy is expected to have a strong
negative effect on the likelihood of conflict (Oneal, et al. 1993). Like Souva and Prins (2006), I
expect that foreign direct investment (FDI) dependence will have a negative effect on the
likelihood of MID initiation. FDI will be determined by dividing the total amount of FDI by a
country’s gross domestic product (GDP); the data will be gathered from the World Bank. Also,
like Souva and Prins (2006), I will use the Penn World Table to get access to data about a state’s
trade openness as a proxy for trade dependence (Heston, Summers, and Aten 2012). Openness is
calculated by taking the sum of imports and exports and dividing the sum by the state’s gross
national product (GNP). Finally, I will include GDP per capita as a measure of economic
development within the potential initiating state (Souva and Prins 2006, 192). Each of these
measures has been found to decrease the likelihood of violent MID initiation (Souva and Prins
2006).
Since some politically-relevant dyads contain states that are not necessarily contiguous
(i.e. major power – any state dyad); territorial contiguity will be included as a separate control
variable. The data for geographic contiguity will be gathered using the EUGene software. The
measure of contiguity is ordinal. The further away states in a dyad become the higher the
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number. 1 being the states that share a land border and 6 being states that are separated by up to
450 miles of water (Bennett and Stam 2000b). Geographic contiguity has been shown to increase
the likelihood of conflict between two states in the previous research because of an increased
opportunity (Leeds 2003, 434).
Another control variable is pulled from Leeds’s (2003) research on the important effect
of alliances on the likelihood a state will initiate a MID. The control variable of interest in my
data set is the presence or absence of an ally for the potential target state (side B) that has
promised to come to their aid if attacked. The variable is binary for each directed dyad-year
(Leeds 2005). The presence of a defensive ally is expected to have a statistically significant,
negative effect on the likelihood a side A state will initiate a MID (Leeds 2003).
A final control I will include is the logarithm of the capability ratio between potential
initiators and potential targets (Russett and Oneal 2001, 103). Like Russett and Oneal I expect a
negative relationship between the capability ratio and the likelihood of MID initiation (2001,
107-108). This means that as the ratio becomes larger – meaning that the potential challenger
state has a greater share of the dyadic capabilities relative to the potential target – the likelihood
of initiating a MID decreases. The data will be taken from the Correlates of War project
capabilities data set using the EUGene program. The CINC score is based on data on states’ total
population, urban population, energy consumption, iron and steel production, military
expenditures, and the size of armed forces. The score represents each state’s share of the world’s
total for each of these subindicies (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972 as cited in Hegre 2008,
577).
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Methods
Though the issue of temporal dependence can be common in research using MID data,
my sample is not vulnerable to this problem because I explicitly drop any ongoing conflict years.
Leaving those in place would do serious damage to the assumption of independence among cases
(Bennett and Stam 2000a, 661). Therefore, I will be using a logistic regression model to calculate
the effect of the independent variable and control variables, on the likelihood of dispute
initiation. I will use the Relogit specification for carrying out logistic regression with rara events
data (Tomz, King, and Zeng 1999). I will also utilize sample averages method to determine the
effect of a particular independent variable, holding all other variables constant at their sample
means, on the estimated probability of the dependent variable (Pollock 2012, 233-234). Finally, I
will include an ANOVA analysis to consider the variance in mean distrust scores between
leaders who initiate MIDs and those who do not.
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FINDINGS
The most basic models in this paper rely upon demonstrating that there is a statistically
significant difference between leaders who initiate MIDs and those who do not. Therefore, I first
present the results of ANOVA models for both psychological variables. The first model
considers distrust. Leaders who initiate MIDs have an average distrust score of approximately
.14, while leaders who do not initiate MIDs have a mean distrust score of .10. The difference
between the two groups is in the expected direction: leaders who initiate MIDs are on average
more distrustful than those who do not. The difference between the two mean scores is
statistically significant, as seen in the ANOVA results, F(1,600, 1) = 19.94, p < .0001. The
results are presented in Table 1.
Table 1. ANOVA Results Distrust

Observations

Mean

1,562
.098
Non-Initiators
39
.135
Initiators
The same question is posed for the psychological variable need for power. In this case, as
with distrust, there is a difference in the average need for power scores between initiators and
non-initiators. Initiators have an average need for power score of .249, while non-initiators
average .259. The difference is in the expected direction: leaders who initiate MIDs have a
higher average score for need for power than those who do not. Further, the difference is
statistically significant as seen in the ANOVA results, F(1,600, 1) = 3.06, p = .0802.
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Table 2. ANOVA Results Need for Power

Non-Initiators
Initiators

Observations

Mean

1,562
39

.249
.259

The significant differences between the two groups is very interesting indeed. What has
been demonstrated in this section is that individual-level variables, which would be expected to
vary in less than predictable ways between heads of state, are to some degree predictable. In
these two models, I have successfully demonstrated that initiators are more distrustful and have a
greater need for power than leaders who do not initiate MIDs.
Before discussing the results of the logistic regression, a discussion of potential
correlations between the independent variables is needed. The correlations for each of the
independent variables are presented in Table 3. First, I will discuss the correlations between the
psychological variables of interest and the control variables. When considering the relationship
between distrust and need for power, it is apparent that the relationship is statistically significant
and weakly positive (r = .1256). Though the correlation is weakly positive, it would be
worthwhile to create models that will explore each psychological variable without the other.
The most powerful correlation is between the polity score for the side A state and the
GDP per capita of the potential challenger state. There is a statistically significant and strong
positive relationship between the GDP per capita and the ordinal polity score for the potential
challenger (r = .7404). Granted, this relationship is not surprising given the well documented
relationship between market prosperity and the emergence of democracy (for review see
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Mousseau 2000). Nevertheless, I will explore the effect of the correlation in the logistic
regression models to follow.
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Table 3 Correlations of Independent Variables

Cap
Contig
PolityA
JointDem
nPower
Distrust
Defense
Trade
Open
FDI
GDPpc

Cap

Contig

PolityA

JointDem

nPower

Distrust

Defense

----

.1815
(0.0000)

0.0266
(0.0272)
.1199
(0.0000)

-0.2247
(0.0000)
-0.0241
(0.0000)
0.3587
(0.0000)

-0.049
(0.0000)
0.0024
(0.8424)
0.1518
(0.0000)
0.1125
(0.0000)

-0.0985
(0.0000)
-0.0444
(0.0002)
-0.1157
(0.0000)
-0.0532
(0.0000)
0.1256
(0.0000)

-0.1087
(0.0000)
-0.0847
(0.0003)
0.1075
(0.0000)
0.3670
(0.0000)
0.0922
(0.0001)
-0.0536
(0.0211)

.1815
(0.0000)
0.0266
(0.0272)
-0.2247
(0.0000)
-0.049
(0.0000)
-0.0985
(0.0000)
-0.1087
(0.0000)
-0.3358
(0.0000)
-0.1393
(0.0000)
0.0313
(0.0095)

---.1199
(0.0000)
-0.0241
(0.0000)
0.0024
(0.8424)
-0.0444
(0.0002)
-0.0847
(0.0003)
-0.1448
(0.0000)
0.0146
(0.0000)
0.1764
(0.0000)

---0.3587
(0.0000)
0.1518
(0.0000)
-0.1157
(0.0000)
0.1075
(0.0000)
-0.0310
(0.0099)
0.0796
(0.0000)
0.7404
(0.0000)

---0.1125
(0.0000)
-0.0532
(0.0000)
0.3670
(0.0000)
0.0162
(0.2047)
0.1250
(0.0000)
0.4265
(0.000)

---0.1256
(0.0000)
0.0922
(0.0001)
-0.1087
(0.0000)
0.1011
(0.0000)
0.1981
(0.0000)

Note: P-values presented in parentheses under r, N=1,601
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----0.0536
(0.0211)
0.2448
(0.0000)
0.0852
(0.0000)
-0.1934
(0.0000)

----0.1209
(0.0000)
0.0528
(0.0241)
0.2650
(0.0000)

Trade
Open
-0.3358
(0.0000)
-0.1448
(0.0000)
-0.0310
(0.0099)
0.0162
(0.2047)
-0.1087
(0.0000)
0.2448
(0.0000)
-0.1209
(0.0000)
----0.3701
(0.0000)
-0.1854
(0.0000)

FDI

GDPpc

-0.1393
(0.0000)
0.0146
(0.0000)
0.0796
(0.0000)
0.1250
(0.0000)
0.1011
(0.0000)
0.0852
(0.0000)
0.0528
(0.0241)
0.3701
(0.0000)

0.0313
(0.0095)
0.1764
(0.0000)
0.7404
(0.0000)
0.4265
(0.0000)
0.1981
(0.0000)
-0.1934
(0.0000)
0.2650
(0.0000)
-0.1854
(0.0000)
0.1995
(0.0000)

---0.1995
(0.0000)

-----

Now that a difference between leaders who initiate MIDs and those who do not has been
established, I turn to the multivariate logistic regression models in Table 4. Model 1 is the full
multivariate model with all the control variables. The purpose of this model is determine which,
if any, of the control variables fail to achieve statistical significance and can thus be omitted
from subsequent models. The control variables behave as expected. First, the ratio of capabilities
between the two states in the dyad performs as expected. As the potential challenger becomes
more powerful relative to the potential target, the likelihood of that state initiating a MID
decreases in a statistically significant way (p < .001). The results perform as expected as well for
territorial contiguity. The farther apart the two states get, the less likely a state is to initiate a
MID. Joint democracy lessens the likelihood of MID initiation, and the presence of a defensive
ally for the target state also decreases the likelihood of MID initiation. However, FDI, trade
openness, and GDP per capita fail to achieve significance despite the effects being in the
expected direction.
Turning to the psychological variables of interest, model one indicates that distrust
behaves as expected by hypothesis 1. Distrust has a statistically significant positive effect on the
likelihood that a leader will initiate a militarized interstate dispute; the higher a leader’s level of
distrust, the more likely he or she is to initiate a MID. In model 1, however, need for power fails
to achieve significance at the p < .10 level though the relationship is in the expected direction. In
the following models I will remove the control variables that fail to achieve significance. This
will give me the opportunity to consider the effect of my psychological variables and the
significant controls without the statistical noise of the insignificant controls.
Now, I turn to Model 2. In this model, I remove all control variables that fail to achieve
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statistical significance, except for need for power, which is not removed from model 2 since it is
one of the independent variables of interest. The insignificant variables are removed from model
2, and all subsequent models, because they do not lend anymore insight to the understanding of
MID initiation. Above, there was discussion of the strong significant relationship between the
polity score for the potential challenger state and the GDP per capita of the potential challenger
state. Though the test is not reported in Table 4, removing the polity score and leaving in GDP
per capita did not have any effect on the significance of GDP per capita (p = .358). Therefore,
even when taking this significant correlation into account, GDP per capita does not have any
significant effect on the likelihood of MID initiation. As a result, the models testing this did not
merit reporting in Table 4.
After removing the insignificant variables in model 2, need for power achieves statistical
significance at the p < .10 level and the relationship is positive as hypothesis 2 predicted. This
indicates that as a leader’s need for power increases, he/she is more likely to initiate a MID.
Distrust continues to have a significant positive effect on the likelihood a potential challenger
will initiate a MID. The power of the potential challenger state relative to the potential target
state continues to have a significant negative effect on the likelihood of MID initiation. Similarly
territorial contiguity, joint democracy, and the presence of a defensive ally for the potential target
state continue to have a statistically significant negative effect on the likelihood of MID
initiation.
Since distrust and need for power are both psychological characteristics operating at the
individual level of analysis, it is possible that both are competing for similar sources of the
variance in the dependent variable, thus reducing the significance of the impact of each. Support
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for this assertion comes in part from the statistically significant positive correlation between the
two variables reported in Table 3. To test these effects, I ran two more models. Model 3, keeps
need for power in the model but removes distrust. In this model, all the control variables
maintain their respective directions and statistical significance. In model 3, need for power does
indeed reach standard levels of significance (b=7.44, p < .05). As the need for power of a leader
increases, there is a statistically-significantly higher likelihood that the state will initiate a MID,
even when controlling for important and significant structural variables. In model 4, I remove
need for power and consider just distrust in relation to the other structural control variables. As
model 4 demonstrates, distrust continues to be statistically significant without the presence of
need for power when considered alongside the other structural variables. Finally, the effect of
distrust is stronger without need for power in the model.
Finally, in Model 5, I test the possibility that distrust’s significance relies on territorial
contiguity. Therefore, I remove territorial contiguity from model 5 and review the effect. After
removing territorial contiguity from model 5, need for power loses its significance once again.
However, distrust does not. Model 5 demonstrates that distrust can stand on its own as an
explanatory variable without the inclusion of territorial contiguity. However, need for power has
some sort of reliance on the presence of territorial contiguity for its significance.
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Table 4. Logistic Regression Models
Variable
nPower
Distrust
Capability Ratio
Contiguity
Joint Democracy
Polity Side A
Defensive Ally Side
B
FDI
Trade Openness
GDP Per Cap
Constant
N

Model 1
5.13
(3.39)
6.56***
(2.87)
-.296****
(.083)
-.358****
(.082)
-1.05**
(.495)
-.017
(.016)
-.922*
(.476)
-0.0000015
(0.00000696)
-.015
(.012)
-.0000108
(.0000293)
3.39
1,601

Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
4.24*
7.44**
----(3.19)
(3.56)
6.80***
8.01***
----(2.75)
(2.81)
-.249**** -.238**** -.251****
(.067)
(.062)
(.068)
-.361**** -.365**** -.358****
(.073)
(.072)
(.073)
-1.28**** -1.50**** -1.25***
(.425)
(.432)
(.422)

Model 5
3.71
(3.68)
7.34***
(2.71)
-.264****
(.059)
-----1.69****
(.457)

-----

-----

-----

-----

-.829*
(.445)

-.672**
(.409)

-.815**
(1.23)

-.211
(.465)

-----

-----

-----

-----

-----

-----

-----

-----

-----

-----

-----

-----

-2.65***
1,601

-2.67***
1,601

-1.75***
1,601

-4.09****
1,601

*p < .10 **p < .05 ***p < .01 ****p < .001 Note: Standard Error in parentheses below logit coefficients.

Next, I will evaluate the predicted probabilities for two of my psychological variables and
compare the performance of those variables to territorial contiguity, one of the most consistently
important structural variables in conflict studies (Bremer 1992). Further, this control variable is
highly significant in all of my models with a p-value consistently p < .001. Logistic regression
allows us to think of the effect of independent variables on dichotomous dependent variables in
terms of odds ratios and percentage change in the odds of a 1 (MID initiation) instead of a 0 (no
MID initiation) (Pollock 2012b, 200). However, the method also assumes a nonlinear
relationship between need for power and distrust and the probability of initiating a MID (Pollock
2012b, 200). This means that logistic regression assumes that a one unit increase in distrust/need
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for power will have less of an effect on those with extremely high or extremely low distrust/need
for power, but that a one unit increase will have a much greater effect on those who have
moderate scores for need for power and/or distrust. The people who score extremely high on
these traits are already likely to initiate a MID and those who are extremely low are likely to not
initiate a MID. However, for those with moderate scores for these psychological traits, a one unit
increase along one or both of these traits (i.e. going from a distrust score of 0.1 to a distrust of
0.2) could be the difference between deciding to initiate a MID and deciding not to initiate a
MID (Pollock 2012, 200). Rather than dealing with odds ratios or percentage change in the odds,
it is much easier to think about the effect of need for power and distrust on the probability of
initiating a MID. As a result, I turn to predicted probabilities. The predicted probability graphs
are a visual representation of the effect of distrust, need for power, and territorial contiguity on
the probability of MID initiation.3
Figure 1 shows the predicted probability curve for distrust, the psychological variable
from hypothesis one. Remember that initiators and non-initiators differ in a statistically
significant way regarding this variable, and that distrust is a consistently significant explanatory
variable for MID initiation. The distrust score is along the x-axis and the probability of initiating
a MID at each value of the independent variable is on the y-axis. The curve indicates visual
support for hypothesis one: as the value for distrust increases, the probability of MID initiation
also increases. The probability of initiating a MID at the lowest score for distrust is
approximately .0025, while the probability of initiating a MID at the highest score for distrust is

3

In response to a comment from a committee member, I explored the possibility that the significance of the
variables depends upon the regime type of a state. I tested the model looking only at the effects for autocracies and
democracies separately. The results were insignificant, indicating the polity score for side A worked better as a
control variable.
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approximately .07. A change from a score of 0.1 for distrust to 0.2 moves the probability of MID
initiation from approximately .01 to approximately .02. However, the overall probability remains
low because this study is dealing with the occurrence of a rare event, thus the baseline

0

.02

.04

.06

.08

probability of a MID occurring at all is low regardless of the independent variables of interest.

0

.1

.2
Distrust

.3

.4

Figure 1 Predicted Probabilities – Distrust4
The predicted probabilities of need for power are presented in Figure 2. Like distrust,
need for power behaves as expected. Figure 2 demonstrates that at the lowest score for need for
power, the probability of initiating a MID is approximately .007. As the predicted probability
curve moves up to its maximum score for need for power, the probability of MID initiation
becomes approximately .027. Figure 2 demonstrates that as need for power moves from the

4

Tab Stats appear in Appendix E

34

lowest score of approximately 0.17 to the highest score of approximately .425, the probability of

.005

.01

.015

.02

.025

a state initiating a MID increases accordingly. This provides additional support for hypothesis 2.

.15

.2

.3

.25

.35

.4

nPower

Figure 2 Predicted Probabilities for - Need for Power5
In Figure 3, I present the predicted probabilities for one of the strongest structural
variables in the conflict studies literature, territorial contiguity. Remember, that contiguity has
time and again had a strong relationship with the likelihood a state will initiate a MID, and that
the further away states in the dyad are, the less likely it is that a state will initiate a MID (Bremer
1992). Contiguity is an important control variable in all of my models. Its importance is
demonstrated by the consistent statistical significance in each of my models. The curve goes in
the expected direction: as states get further away from each other, the probability that the

5

Tab Stats appear in Appendix F
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potential challenger state will initiate a MID decreases. As with the psych variables, despite the
accepted importance of contiguity, the probability remains low because MID initiation is a rare

.01

.02

.03

Pr(MID Initation)

.04

.05

event.

1

2

3

4

5

6

contig

Figure 3 Predicted Probabilities – Territorial Contiguity6
Now I will move into comparing the three different predicted probability models. It has
already been demonstrated that the three variables behave as expected. First, I will explore how
distrust compares with territorial contiguity. The highest level (i.e. maximum score in my data
set) of distrust increases the probability of MID initiation to approximately .07. Whereas, the
probability associated with the lowest score for territorial contiguity – meaning the states in the

6

Tab Stats appear in Appendix G
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dyads are closest to each other and therefore more prone to conflict – is only approximately .048.
This is a profoundly interesting finding. This comparison indicates that a leader’s score for
distrust does a better job of explaining the probability of MID initiation than territorial
contiguity.
Finally, consider the way need for power compares with territorial contiguity. The
maximum score for need for power is associated with a maximum probability of approximately
.027. As stated above, the score for territorial contiguity associated with higher levels of conflict
is associated with a maximum probability of approximately .048. Need for power’s effect on the
probability of MID initiation is not as strong as the effect of territorial contiguity. Nevertheless,
need for power continues to demonstrate a strong positive effect on the probability of MID
initiation. The overarching message of this section is that the psychological variables of interest
in this study perform as well or, in the case of distrust, better than territorial contiguity in terms
of explaining the increased probability of MID initiation.
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

This paper started by asking a straight forward question: do a leader’s psychological traits
affect his/her state’s likelihood of initiating a militarized interstate dispute? The answer is
emphatically yes. The first demonstration came with the ANOVA models that considered
differences between leaders who initiated and those who did not. In agreement with the
expectations, MID-initiating leaders had higher average scores for need for power and distrust,
and the difference between the two groups were statistically significant. Given that one would
expect such traits to vary from person to person in unpredictable ways, the ANOVA tests
demonstrate that the differences between the two groups of leaders are, in fact, quite predictable.
Moving on to the logistic regression models, the assertions made earlier in the paper find
further statistical support. Knowing the groups of leaders are different along these psychological
traits, the logistic regression models demonstrate a statistically significant and positive
relationship between the psychological variables and the likelihood a leader will initiate a MID,
even when controlling for important structural and situational variables. However, it is worth
noting that need for power is less consistent. In model 1, the model with all control variables
present, need for power does not achieve significance at the p < .10 level. Once the nonsignificant structural control variables were removed in subsequent models, need for power
achieved significance at the p < .10 level. Only when distrust was removed in model 3 did need
for power reach significance at the standard p < .05 level. It is also the case that need for power
did not maintain significance without the presence of territorial contiguity. This raises the
possibility that need for power is associated with aggressive foreign policy behavior directed at
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states nearby, something that later studies can investigate more carefully. Nevertheless, need for
power is a noteworthy explanatory variable for understanding the likelihood of MID initiation.
Distrust fares much better throughout the models. Distrust remains significant at the p <
.001 level regardless of which variables are removed in the various models. The data indicate
emphatically that a more distrustful leader is far more likely to be the first militarized mover in
an aggressive dyadic interaction. Of the two psychological variables tested here, distrust is the
most important explanatory variable for the initiation of militarized interstate disputes.
Beyond the ANOVA models and the logistic regression models, the psychological
variables of interest fare very well when I consider the effect they have on probability compared
with a powerful structural control variable. The results showed strong support for my
independent variables of interest. Further, it is worth restating that the psychological variables
performed as well as, and in the case of distrust performed better than, territorial contiguity.
Considering the diversity of my sample, I am not reluctant to say my results are
generalizable. My sample includes leaders from a variety of regions rather than simply relying
on data from great powers or American presidents (i.e. Foster and Keller 2013). To my
knowledge, my sample is the only one to gather psychological data from such a broad range of
states.
The confidence in my sample does not mean that my research is without limitations.
Some scholars who utilize similar content analysis methods may also take issue with the fact that
I use both prepared speeches and off the cuff press conference statements and other spontaneous
material. It could be argued that the act of preparing speech creates opportunities for speech
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writers to contaminate the text with their psychological characteristics or biases. However, it is
hard to believe that a head of state will use a speech written by someone else that is drastically
out of line with his/her world view. Additionally, the initial potential sample was limited because
of the availability – or more accurately lack thereof – of speech texts. So, though I have a
broader range of states than existing studies, some cases simply had to be dropped in an ad hoc
fashion.
The admitted limitations notwithstanding, the findings I have presented here have made a
strong a case for the importance of leaders’ psychological traits in explaining the initiation of
militarized interstate disputes. Distrustful leaders as well as leaders with a high need for power
are more likely to initiate MIDs than heads of state that score lower on these traits. Given the
more comprehensive (in terms of states included) and larger sample size than previous research
in this area, I believe the case made here for the importance of psychological variables is
stronger than the previous small-n research from which this paper was derived.
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DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
The interesting findings demonstrated above did leave some questions unanswered.
Therefore, the closing section of this paper will be dedicated to possible future research. As
discussed in the theoretical foundations section, distrust is often spoken about in considered as
response variable. Meaning, that as distrustful leader A observes a troop buildup of leader B,
leader A is more likely to perceive that action as a threat and respond in kind (the classic security
dilemma). With this in mind, another future research project may involve making conflict
escalation the dependent variable of interest. Perhaps a leader high in distrust may be more likely
to militarize a dispute with a state that simply expresses verbal dissatisfaction with either the
dyadic or international status quo. A large-n study of this possibility is lacking in the field and is
something that could almost certainly be carried out.
Much of the research mentioned in the literature review lends itself to the inclusion of
psychological variables. Consider for a moment the balance of power research vein. Perhaps
power shifts increase the likelihood of conflict because the head of the stronger state was more
distrustful of the rising other. Perhaps the significance of power shifts depends upon a leader’s
distrust in the case of the stronger power and/or need for power in the case of the rising power.
Power shifts do not occur in a vacuum, and heads of state make the final decision about when to
initiate militarized conflicts. As was often stated in the literature review, simply focusing on
structure is inadequate for explaining the occurrence of interstate conflict.
Need for power has potential explanatory power beyond the understanding of interstate
conflict. Perhaps making the dependent variable the ‘revisionist state – or the state that wishes to
change the status quo. It is very possible that need for power would have a very strong
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relationship with this variable since a change in – for example – the dyadic status quo would
likely involve elevating the lesser power. Beyond simply the debate over the operationalization
of MID initiator (side A versus Revisionist state), need for power has implication for the broader
operation of foreign policy decision-making than has yet been addressed. If need for power is
truly to be conceptualized as the need to impose one’s will on another person (Hermann 2003,
154) – in the case of foreign policy analysis the state – then perhaps researchers should look past
the use of force as the only means of trying to influence other states. Perhaps need for power
would have a very strong and significant effect on the use of both positive and negative sanctions
be heads of state.
With the emergence and application of automated content-analysis (Profiler Plus), data
set construction (EUGene), and the public availability of speeches by heads of state via the
internet, it is hard to conceive of many of these psychological questions going unanswered.
Applying psychological variables to standard large-n conflict studies models is becoming
increasingly easier to carry out. This research has helped to create a more complete
understanding of the effect of variables from different levels of analysis on the likelihood of
militarized interstate dispute initiation.
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APPENDIX A:
LIST OF MID INITIATORS AND THEIR SCORES
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Year
1995
1996
1996
1996
1996
1996

Country
Russia
Azerbaijan
Russia
China
Cuba
Egypt

1996

South Korea

1996

Philippines

1996

Syria

1996
1996
1997
1997
1997
1997

UK
USA
Russia
Canada
Greece
Philippines

1997

Syria

1997

Ukraine

1997
1997
1998
1998
1999
1999
1999
1999
1999
1999

Uzbekistan
USA
Turkey
USA
Azerbaijan
Australia
Russia
China
Japan
Sierra Leone

1999
2000

UK
Germany

2000

Nigeria

2000
2000
2001

Turkey
UK
Azerbaijan

Leader
Boris Yeltsin
Heydar Aliyev
Boris Yeltsin
Jiang Zemin
Fidel Castro
Hosni
Mubarak
Kim YoungSam
Fidel V.
Ramos
Hafez alAssad
John Major
Bill Clinton
Boris Yeltsin
Jean Chretien
Costas Simitis
Fidel V.
Ramos
Hafez alAssad
Leonid
Kuchma
Islam Karimov
Bill Clinton
Mesut Yilmaz
Bill Clinton
Heydar Aliyev
John Howard
Boris Yeltsin
Jiang Zemin
Keizo Obuchi
Ahmad Tejan
Kabbah
Tony Blair
Gerhard
Schroder
Olusegun
Obasanjo
Bulent Ecevit
Tony Blair
Heydar Aliyev
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Need for Power
.235
0.267
0.215
0.175
0.235
0.254

Distrust
.041
0.061
0.155
0.105
0.157
0.119

0.267

0

0.302

0.183

0.188

0.207

0.251
0.283
0.169
0.192
0.270
0.283

0.046
0.064
0.015
0.085
0.075
0.294

0.199

0.157

0.232

0.078

0.248
0.228
0.267
0.258
0.236
0.228
0.279
0.272
0.267
0.268

0.060
0.094
0.065
0.111
0.076
0.225
0.181
0.078
0.123
0.234

0.228
0.189

0.190
0.167

0.415

0.394

0.307
0.258
0.219

0.107
0.059
0.087

2001
2001
2001
2001

China
France
Honduras
India

2001

Norway

2001
2001

Russia
Sierra Leone

2001
2001
2001

Turkey
UK
USA

Jiang Zemin
Jacques Chirac
Carlos Flores
Atal Bihari
Vajpayee
Jens
Stoltenberg
Vladimir Putin
Ahmad Tejan
Kabbah
Bulent Ecevit
Tony Blair
Bill Clinton
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0.253
0.222
0.240
0.25

0.172
0.055
0.123
0.185

0.293

0.059

0.232
0.277

0.155
0.219

0.409
0.271
0.273

0.049
0.167
0.08

APPENDIX B:
EXCERPT OF SPEECH THAT SCORED HIGHEST IN NEED FOR
POWER AND DISTRUST
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Africans are entitled to celebrate the exit of colonialism from their continent, just in time
before the psychological deadline of the end of this millennium. At the same time, a look into
our immediate past, not to seek whom to blame for our current woes, but to critically review our
realities, will show colonial legacy as an impediment to Africa's progress and development.
Let us face it, the truth is that almost all modern African nation states were conceived and
established by colonial design. And until independence, governance of these nation states was
the complete anti-thesis of democracy, being government of exploitation, by the exploiters, and
for the exploiters. No matter what apologists for colonialism have to say, all manifestations of
progress and development experienced by African peoples under colonialism came by default,
certainly not by the design of those who came to our continent solely for what they could take.
Hence the popular sentiments of the early nationalists who preferred freedom in poverty to
affluence in bondage.
African nationalists who led their nations into independence have confessed to the
daunting challenges in meeting the expectations of their hard won freedom. Leadership of the
nation state felt like the captaincy of a ship which, though legitimately belonged to Africans1 had
been preprogrammed to move in the direction of colonial goals and objectives. To achieve real
nationhood, these African leaders needed to put the African societies and peoples back into the
imposed geopolitical shells. They needed to make the governance of African citizens the
responsibility of Africans themselves. National development needed to have Africans as the
centerpiece, such that progress could be measured in terms of positive impact on the lives of the
citizenry.
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Mere change of name, as many African countries did, was not enough to subdue the
inevitable debate over the nature and purpose of the acquired nationhood. Leadership of the
emergent nations were impelled to find quick solutions to the inherited colonial contradiction of
development concept de-linked from equitable and democratic governance. Success at managing
this contradiction varied from country to country, depending on such circumstances as economic
conditions, geopolitical size, ethnic composition, and the number of educated elites to push their
differing political visions. But invariably, there was attendant confusion, often chaos and violent
upheavals that came with the formidable leadership task of re-focusing, re-orientating and
restructuring the emergent African nation states
Hardly an African nation escaped a phase of instability as political and intellectual
leaders quarreled and fought each other over the meaning of independence and the purpose of
nationhood. And the notion of benevolent dictatorship gained ground as the stable means of
moving African nations forward.
Military incursions into African politics in the sixties and seventies were generally
greeted with degrees of euphoria. The ordinary African felt a sense of security with the uniform,
so to speak. And political thinkers, in disregard of their liberal philosophical noots in democratic
theory, hailed the un-elected military rulers of the post-colonial state by ascribing to them several
virtues.
Score – Distrust: 0.394
Score – Need for Power: 0.415
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APPENDIX C:
EXCERPT OF SPEECH TEXT THAT SCORED LOWEST FOR NEED
FOR POWER
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Esteemed journalists, ladies and gentlemen, the first meeting of the Presidents of Russia
and the United States has been held after our reelection. Naturally, it was a difficult one because
difficult issues were under discussion. But as always, our meeting was quite frank, and on the
whole, it was successful. And I am completely in accord with what the President of the United
States, Bill Clinton, just said.
We have opened a new stage of Russian-American relations. We discussed in detail the
entire range of Russian-American issues—issues of Russian-American partnership, which is
quite broad in scale. After all, our countries occupy such a position in the world that the global
issues are a subject of our discussions.
Both sides defended their national interests, and both countries did not abandon them.
However, our two great powers have an area—a vast area—of congruent interests. Chief among
these is the stability in the international situation. This requires us to develop our relations, and
there has been progress in that direction.
Five joint statements have been signed as a result of our meeting—President Bill Clinton
and I just concluded signing these—on European security, on parameters of future reductions in
nuclear forces, concerning the ABM missile treaty, on chemical weapons, and we also signed a
U.S.-Russian economic initiative. But we have not merely stated our positions. We view the
signed statements with the U.S. President as a program of our joint action aimed to develop
Russian-American partnership.
I would say that emotions sometimes get the upper hand in assessing Russian-American
partnership. This is not the approach that Bill and I have. Let's not forget that establishing the
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Russian-American partnership relations is a very complex process. We want to overcome that
which divided us for decades. We want to do away with the past mistrust and animosity. We
cannot accomplish this immediately. We need to be decisive and patient, and we have both with
Bill Clinton.
I firmly believe that we will be able to resolve all issues which, for the time being, are
still outstanding. Today's meeting with Bill convinced me of this once again. We will be doing
this consistently, step by step. We will have enough patience and decisiveness.
And now I ask you to put questions to us.
I don't agree with you. It was today that we had progress, very principled progress, and
they consist of the following— that, yes, indeed, we do maintain our positions. We believe that
the eastward expansion of NATO is a mistake and a serious one at that. Nevertheless, in order to
minimize the negative consequences for Russia, we decided to sign an agreement with NATO, a
Russia-NATO agreement. And this is the principal question here. We've agreed on the
parameters of this document with President Bill Clinton.
This is the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, to those new members of NATO to not
proliferate conventional weapons in these countries. We agreed on non-use of the military
infrastructure which remained in place after the Warsaw Pact in these countries of Central and
Eastern Europe. The decision of joint actions with Russia alone, this, too, will be included in the
agreement with NATO.
Score – Need for Power: .169
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APPENDIX D:
EXCERPT OF SPEECH THAT SCORED LOWEST ON DISTRUST
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Today President Clinton and I exchanged wide-ranging views and opinions on the
situation on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia and agreed to further strengthen
cooperation between our two countries to preserve the peace and stability of the region.
President Clinton reaffirmed the United States firm commitment to the security of the
Republic of Korea, and I supported the U.S. policy of foreign deployment, of U.S. troops to
maintain peace in East Asia. President Clinton and I reconfirmed that maintaining and
strengthening a firm, joint Korean-U.S. defense posture is essential to safeguarding the peace and
stability not only of the Korean Peninsula but also of the Northeast Asian region.
We share the view that improvement of relations between the United States and North
Korea should proceed in harmony and parallel with the improvement of relations between the
Republic of Korea and North Korea. We also agreed that our two countries will cooperate
closely with each other in encouraging North Korea to open its doors in order to ease tensions on
the Korean Peninsula and promote peace in Northeast Asia.
With regard to this issue, I noted that the issue of establishing a permanent peace regime
on the Korean Peninsula should be pursued through dialog between South and North Korea,
under the principle that the issues should be resolved between the parties directly concerned.
President Clinton expressed the U.S. total support and resolve to cooperate with the Republic of
Korea regarding this issue.
Korean Government supports the results of the Geneva agreement and Kuala Lumpur
agreement. And President Clinton and I affirmed that the Governments of our two countries,
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while maintaining close coordination with regard to the implementation of the U.S.-North
Korean agreement, will continue to provide the support needed by the Korean Peninsula Energy
Development Organization.
President Clinton and I express satisfaction over the fact that the economic and trade
relations between our two countries have entered a mature phase in terms of the size of our
bilateral trade, the trade balance, and bilateral investments and should continue to develop
further on a well-balanced basis. At the same time, we reaffirmed that our two nations will
further expand mutually beneficial bilateral cooperation under the new international economic
conditions being created by the inauguration of the World Trade Organization. We also agreed
that any bilateral trade issues arising out of increasing volumes of trade between two countries
will be resolved smoothly through working-level consultations.
President Clinton and I concurred that our two countries need to further improve bilateral
relations, both in terms of quality and quantity, so that in the forthcoming Asia-Pacific era of the
21st century, our two nations can assume leading roles in enhancing cooperation and the
development of the Asia-Pacific region.
In this context, President Clinton and I agreed to coordinate closely with each other to
ensure that the upcoming APEC summit conference in November of this year in Osaka will be a
success. Furthermore, we agreed that our two countries will bolster multipronged collaboration
in the United Nations and other international organizations.
Score – Distrust: 0

54

APPENDIX E:
TAB STATS FOR DISTRUST
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distrust

Predicted prob

0
.015
.033
.041
.043
.046
.049
.055
.056
.058
.059
.059
.060
.061
.064
.065
.067
.072
.073
.075
.076
.078
.078
.079
.081
.085
.087
.088
.093
.094
.103
.105
.108
.109
.1098
.111
.114
.118
.119
.123
.123
.131

.006
.007
.007
.008
.008
.0081
.0083
.0086
.0086
.0088
.0088
.0088
.0089
.009
.0091
.0092
.0093
.0096
.0096
.0098
.0098
.010
.010
.010
.010
.010
.011
.011
.011
.011
.012
.012
.012
.012
.012
.012
.013
.013
.013
.013
.013
.014
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.142
.155
.155
.157
.157
.167
.167
.172
.180
.181
.183
.185
.185
.200
.207
.2197
.225
.234
.394

.015
.016
.017
.017
.017
.018
.018
.018
.019
.019
.0197
.0199
.020
.022
.023
.025
.026
.027
.074

Total

.012
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APPENDIX F:
TAB STATS NEED FOR POWER
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npower

Predicted prob

.169
.175
.179
.188
.1896
.192
.199
.200
.215
.216
.218
.218
.219
.222
.228
.228
.231
.232
.232
.235
.236
.239
.239
.240
.241
.244
.248
.25
.253
.254
.255
.258
.258
.259
.263
.267
.267
.267
.268
.268
.269
.270

.008
.008
.008
.008
.008
.009
.009
.009
.0096
.0097
.0097
.0098
.0098
.0099
.010
.010
.010
.010
.010
.011
.011
.011
.011
.011
.011
.011
.011
.011
.012
.013
.012
.012
.012
.012
.012
.012
.012
.013
.013
.013
.013
.013
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.271
.271
.275
.277
.278
.279
.279
.283
.289
.293
.296
.302
.307
.307
.325
.325
.409
.415

.013
.013
.013
.013
.013
.013
.013
.014
.014
.014
.014
.015
.015
.015
.017
.017
.026
.026

Total

.012
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APPENDIX G:
TAB STATS TERRITORIAL CONTIGUITY
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contig

Predicted prob

1
2
3
4
5
6

.047
.033
.023
.015
.012
.008

Total

.015
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